error-theoretic

Therefore anyone claiming to perceive either thing must be mistaken (hence their need for an error-theoretic account of morality).

Carry-Over Thread 2007

Otherwise we are left either with the error-theoretic conclusion that there are no moral properties or the non-cognitivist conclusion that moral vocabulary does not even purport to refer (in the sense of ˜refer™ in play when one does serious metaphysics, anyway; again, the non-cognitivist will allow that we can ˜speak with the vulgar™ here).

Moral Non-Naturalism Ridge, Michael 2008

This strategy includes non-cognitivist views like emotivism and prescriptivism which deny that moral judgements express beliefs (Hare 1952, Blackburn 1993, Gibbard 2003), and also error-theoretic and fictionalist views that accept that moral judgements do express beliefs about moral properties, but deny that any such properties exist (Mackie 1977, Kalderon 2005).

Naturalism Papineau, David 2007

Suppose also that one is persuaded of the unattractiveness of both error-theoretic and expressivist forms of non-realism.

Realism Miller, Alexander 2005

J.L. Mackie, on the other hand, proposes an error-theoretic account of morals, not because there are no objects or entities that could form the subject matter of ethics (it is no part of Mackie's brief to deny the existence of persons and their actions and so on), but because it is implausible to suppose that the sorts of properties that moral properties would have to be are ever instantiated in the world (Mackie 1977, Ch. 1).

Realism Miller, Alexander 2005