logicism

The rejoinder to this is that the similarity that Frascolla, Black and Savitt recognize does not make Wittgenstein's theory a “kind of logicism” in Frege's or Russell's sense, because Wittgenstein does not define numbers “logically” in either Frege's way or Russell's way, and the similarity (or analogy) between tautologies and true mathematical equations is neither an identity nor a relation of reducibility.

Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Mathematics Rodych, Victor 2007

“the philosophy of arithmetic of the Tractatus ¦ as a kind of logicism” (Frascolla, 1994, 37).

Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Mathematics Rodych, Victor 2007

A principled demarcation of logical constants might offer an answer to this question, thereby clarifying what is at stake in philosophical controversies for which it matters what counts as logic (for example, logicism and structuralism in the philosophy of mathematics).

Logical Constants MacFarlane, John 2009

Tarski also showed new perspectives for logicism by defining logical concepts as invariants under one-to-one transformations.

Lvov-Warsaw School Wole&324;ski, Jan 2009

The slide towards this sort of formalist attitude to axioms can also be traced through Frege's logicism.

Non-Deductive Methods in Mathematics Baker, Alan 2009

No. To see why it is not, notice that the ascription of limitations and confusions to his logical theory depends almost entirely on taking a special point of view on the nature of logic, namely the viewpoint of Fregean and Russellian logicism, which posits the reducibility of mathematics (or at least arithmetic) to some version of second-order logic.

Kant's Theory of Judgment Hanna, Robert 2009

This attitude allowed him to accommodate various ideas coming from rival foundational directions, that is, logicism, formalism and intuitionism.

Lvov-Warsaw School Wole&324;ski, Jan 2009

Fregean logicism is just one way in which this template can be developed; some other ways will be mentioned below.

Platonism in the Philosophy of Mathematics Linnebo, Øystein 2009

Pragmatism's injunction to abandon metaphysics might then be thought of as setting the stage for the radically different idioms of Heidegger's ontology and Carnap's logicism, or what is sometimes called the Continental/analytic divide.

Archive 2008-11-01 enowning 2008

Pragmatism's injunction to abandon metaphysics might then be thought of as setting the stage for the radically different idioms of Heidegger's ontology and Carnap's logicism, or what is sometimes called the Continental/analytic divide.

enowning enowning 2008