Tim

TIM ROEMER, 9/11 COMMISSION MEMBER: She would sometimes come up to me as we were grilling witnesses on what happened on 9/11 and she'd tell me, here Tim, here's four or five more questions to ask these folks.

CNN Transcript Feb 13, 2009 2009

TIM MILLER, TEXAS EQUUSEARCH: Leonard told me, Tim, you don ` t realize the opportunity we ` re missing, gave me the story about why he thought that.

CNN Transcript Nov 14, 2008 2008

Reliabilism, on the other hand, allows that, even though Tim and Tim* are mentally alike, they differ justificationally, since Tim's beliefs are (by and large) produced by reliable cognitive faculties, whereas the faculties that produce Tim*'s beliefs may count as unreliable.

Epistemology Steup, Matthias 2005

Distinguish between Tim and Tim*: one and the same person whom we imagine in two altogether different situations.

Epistemology Steup, Matthias 2005

Even though there are significant physical differences between Tim and Tim*, mentally they are alike.

Epistemology Steup, Matthias 2005

Indeed, let's assume that the mental states of Tim and the mental states of Tim* are alike.

Epistemology Steup, Matthias 2005

Evidentialism implies that, since Tim and Tim* are mentally alike, they have the same evidence, and thus are justificationally alike as well.

Epistemology Steup, Matthias 2005

The example of Tim and Tim* may serve as well to illustrate a further way in which we may conceive of the difference between internalism and externalism.

Epistemology Steup, Matthias 2005

When we apply this principle to the Tim/Tim* example, it tells us that evidentialism is an internalist and reliabilism an externalist theory.

Epistemology Steup, Matthias 2005

For example, some versions of reliabilism imply that Tim is justified in believing that he has hands, whereas Tim* is not.

Epistemology Steup, Matthias 2005