Tye's

Tye's suggestion is that veridical perceptions and hallucinations have contents with a common structure, and this structure may be conceived as having a slot in it for an object.

Petty Injuries 2009

On Tye's account, images are "(labeled) interpreted symbol-filled arrays."

Mental Representation Pitt, David 2008

It is not clear whether joint consciousness is really an alternative to Tye's notion of same phenomenal content or an attempt to say something about what yields such content.

The Unity of Consciousness Brook, Andrew 2006

On the other hand, there is also some similarity among the theories, which can be brought out by noting a criticism of Dennett's view, analogues of which arise for Tye's and Dretske's views as well.

Consciousness and Intentionality Siewert, Charles 2006

This is Tye's object unity; Bayne and Chalmers 'objectual unity is at least a related notion.

The Unity of Consciousness Brook, Andrew 2006

Similarly, Bayne and Chalmers (2003, pp. 24-7) distinguish objectual unity (a matter of two conscious experiences of one object, so different from Tye's object unity), spatial unity, subject unity, and subsumptive unity, the last a matter of two or more conscious states becoming aspects of a single conscious state.

The Unity of Consciousness Brook, Andrew 2006

For one might think that the hypothetical blindsighter would be as rightly regarded as having Tye's

Consciousness and Intentionality Siewert, Charles 2006

For Tye's and Dretske's theories, though they depend on forms of that contrast (and are offered as theories of phenomenal consciousness), can raise similar concerns.

Consciousness and Intentionality Siewert, Charles 2006

The notion that there is a fundamental distinction to be drawn in kinds of intentional content (separating the more intellectual from the more sensory departments of mind) sometimes forms the basis of an account of consciousness (as with Dretske's and Tye's, though not with Dennett's).

Consciousness and Intentionality Siewert, Charles 2006

As we saw, Kant distinguishes between two kinds of synthesis, being conscious of individual objects (Tye's object unity) and being conscious of a number of objects at the same time.

The Unity of Consciousness Brook, Andrew 2006