counterinsurgents

One of the more important developments augured by the rise of the counterinsurgents is the embrace of a community typically viewed as an obstacle to military operations.

Human Rights In America: COIN Edition | ATTACKERMAN 2009

But the counterinsurgents are the first in the military to abandon an institutional hostility to the human rights community and seek a partnership, however fraught with natural divergences of interest in some cases.

Human Rights In America: COIN Edition | ATTACKERMAN 2009

Our results support the theory's predictions: counterinsurgents are most generous with government services in locations where they expect violence; improved service provision has reduced insurgent violence since the summer of 2007; and the violence-reducing effect of service provision varies predictably across communities.

Buying Growth, Buying Hearts 2009

Davidson was a key figure in setting up the Consortium for Complex Operations, an inter-agency portal for counterinsurgents around the government to work together ahead of deployments to Iraq or Afghanistan.

Ladies First | ATTACKERMAN 2009

His alternative metric—the amount of information provided by the population to the counterinsurgents—is excellent in principle, but its utility is constrained by human nature.

Beyond Measure Mark Moyar 2011

Early counterinsurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan suffered from the same ignorance.

An Insurgency and Its Lessons Mark Moyar 2011

U.S. analysts also made good use of captured documents, prisoner interrogations and signals intercepts: These sources proved to be the most reliable, because the insurgents, unlike the counterinsurgents, derived no personal benefit from reporting U.S. successes.

Beyond Measure Mark Moyar 2011

COIN doctrine asserts the importance not just of the protection of civilians from killings by counterinsurgents (in this case, U.S. and allied forces), but the protection of the people in general.

Derrick Crowe: Afghanistan Rights Monitor Slams Washington Spin About "Progress" in Afghanistan 2010

Talented as Lt.Gen. Caldwell is, he's still short on trainers, and he has to teach his Afghan recruits to read before they can become effective counterinsurgents.

'Hard Is Not Hopeless' in Afghanistan John A. Nagl 2010

In any counterinsurgency war where guerrillas, faced with vastly superior fire power, fight from cover and work hard to blend in with the populace, where the counterinsurgents are foreigners about as alien from the land they are to "protect" as humanly possible, and fight, in part, from on high or based on "intelligence" from others about a world they can't fathom, civilians will die.

Tom Engelhardt: Advice for General Petraeus on the Rules of Engagement: It's Neither/Nor, Not Either/Or 2010