dialetheia

Assuming the fairly uncontroversial view that falsity just is the truth of negation, it can equally be claimed that a dialetheia is a sentence which is both true and false.

Dialetheism Priest, Graham 2008

A dialetheia is a sentence, A, such that both it and its negation, ¬A, are true (we shall talk of sentences throughout this entry; but one could run the definition in terms of propositions, statements, or whatever one takes as her favourite truth-bearer: this would make little difference in the context).

Dialetheism Priest, Graham 2008

Since none of the motivations for believing in the existence of dialetheia apply here, I will ignore the last possibility.

The Problem of the Many Weatherson, Brian 2009

For instance, a dialetheia would seem to resurface with reference to Aristotle's puzzle: at the instant when a (homogeneous) object undergoes the transition from being stationary to moving it must be both stationary and moving.

Boundary Varzi, Achille 2008

One is, for instance, that even though a dialetheia does not rule our its negation, it still may rule out several other things.

Dialetheism Priest, Graham 2008

This technique is called parameterisation and is adopted quite generally: when one collides with a seemingly true contradiction, A & ¬A, it is a common strategy to treat the suspected dialetheia A, or some of its parts, as having different meanings, that is to say, precisely as ambiguous (maybe just contextually ambiguous).

Dialetheism Priest, Graham 2008

If one accepts the plausible view that statements concerning legal rights, obligations, and statuses, can be truth-value apt, we seem to have a dialetheia.

Dialetheism Priest, Graham 2008

If we accept the aforementioned Law of Bivalence, that is, the principle according to which all sentences are either true or false, both alternatives lead to a contradiction: (1) is both true and false, that is, a dialetheia, against the LNC.

Dialetheism Priest, Graham 2008

For a given A to be a dialetheia, putting things in these terms, it is sufficient that there be overlap between the worlds where A holds, and those where its negation holds.

Dialetheism Priest, Graham 2008

A dual position can hold for dialetheism: given that accepting ¬A is different from rejecting A, a dialetheist can do the former and not the latter ” exactly when she thinks that A is a dialetheia.

Dialetheism Priest, Graham 2008