disjunctivism

(such as disjunctivism) is correct, the most defensible non-skeptical account of how beliefs concerning material objects are justified will still be fundamentally a version of representative realism.

Epistemological Problems of Perception BonJour, Laurence 2007

Byrne and Logue (2008) propose that the label ˜metaphysical disjunctivism™ be reserved for an account of perceptual experience that commits to the claim there is no common mental element to veridical perception and hallucination.

Petty Injuries 2009

They note that a view according to which there is a common mental element to veridical perception and hallucination would seem to make ˜disjunctivism™ an inapposite label, and they also note that others who defend a moderate view explicitly deny that their theory is a disjunctivist one.

Petty Injuries 2009

One significant recent source of motivation for disjunctivism (common to the views proposed by Martin, Campbell and Brewer) is the suggestion that we should moving away from representationalist accounts of the way in which our minds are intentionally directed upon the mind-independent world when we perceive it.

Petty Injuries 2009

For example, Paul Snowdon, one of the philosophers most associated with the disjunctivism, appeals to the possibility of a disjunctive approach to perceptual experience in order to undermine an argument for a thesis about our concept of perception.

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An influential argument against disjunctivism is the causal argument, first proposed by Howard Robinson.

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A.D. Smith (2008b) has argued that Husserl held views that commit him to disjunctivism.

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One can therefore be an epistemological disjunctivist without accepting metaphysical disjunctivism.

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Byrne and Logue (2008) distinguish a version of disjunctivism that they label epistemological disjunctivism.

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Let us call a view of this sort fundamental kind disjunctivism.

Petty Injuries 2009