Definitions
from Wiktionary, Creative Commons Attribution/ShareAlike License
 n. The doctrine that mathematics is a branch of logic in that some or all mathematics is reducible to logic.
from WordNet 3.0 Copyright 2006 by Princeton University. All rights reserved.
 n. (philosophy) the philosophical theory that all of mathematics can be derived from formal logic
Etymologies
Sorry, no etymologies found.
Examples

The rejoinder to this is that the similarity that Frascolla, Black and Savitt recognize does not make Wittgenstein's theory a “kind of logicism” in Frege's or Russell's sense, because Wittgenstein does not define numbers “logically” in either Frege's way or Russell's way, and the similarity (or analogy) between tautologies and true mathematical equations is neither an identity nor a relation of reducibility.

“the philosophy of arithmetic of the Tractatus ¦ as a kind of logicism” (Frascolla, 1994, 37).

This attitude allowed him to accommodate various ideas coming from rival foundational directions, that is, logicism, formalism and intuitionism.

A principled demarcation of logical constants might offer an answer to this question, thereby clarifying what is at stake in philosophical controversies for which it matters what counts as logic (for example, logicism and structuralism in the philosophy of mathematics).

Tarski also showed new perspectives for logicism by defining logical concepts as invariants under onetoone transformations.

No. To see why it is not, notice that the ascription of limitations and confusions to his logical theory depends almost entirely on taking a special point of view on the nature of logic, namely the viewpoint of Fregean and Russellian logicism, which posits the reducibility of mathematics (or at least arithmetic) to some version of secondorder logic.

Fregean logicism is just one way in which this template can be developed; some other ways will be mentioned below.

The slide towards this sort of formalist attitude to axioms can also be traced through Frege's logicism.

Pragmatism's injunction to abandon metaphysics might then be thought of as setting the stage for the radically different idioms of Heidegger's ontology and Carnap's logicism, or what is sometimes called the Continental/analytic divide.

PFO alone does not have sufficient expressive power to accommodate the needs of neologicism.
Comments
Log in or sign up to get involved in the conversation. It's quick and easy.