nolition

I add that, when this latter part of the apostle's sentence is omitted, the reader is left in doubt concerning the kind of volition and nolition which is here the subject of investigation.

The Works of James Arminius, Vol. 2 1560-1609 1956

Because every volition and every nolition follows the judgment of the man respecting the thing presented as an object, each of them, therefore, is also different according to the diversity of the judgment.

The Works of James Arminius, Vol. 2 1560-1609 1956

Those, however, which follow the last judgment, are simply and absolutely called efficacious volition and nolition, to which the effect succeeds.

The Works of James Arminius, Vol. 2 1560-1609 1956

But the volition and nolition which follow not the last judgment, cannot so well be simply and absolutely called "volition" and "nolition," as velicity and nolicity.

The Works of James Arminius, Vol. 2 1560-1609 1956

For he had determined to produce the proper and reciprocal cause, why the man about whom he is treating "does not find to perform that which is good;" and therefore all other causes were to be removed, among which were the nolition of good and the volition of evil, also ignorance of that which is good and that which is evil, &c.

The Works of James Arminius, Vol. 2 1560-1609 1956

It is an illogical mode of expression to say, "I will to lust," and "I will not to lust," because actual concupiscence is prior to volition and nolition, and the act of concupiscence does not depend upon the choice or determination of the will.

The Works of James Arminius, Vol. 2 1560-1609 1956

This volition and nolition may likewise be distinguished in another manner.

The Works of James Arminius, Vol. 2 1560-1609 1956

The apostle is here treating about a volition and a nolition that are incomplete and imperfect, and about the actual perpetration of evil and the omission of good, and not solely about the act or motion of lusting or desiring; (for this is declared by the matter itself, for the man wills and does not, therefore the volition is imperfect.)

The Works of James Arminius, Vol. 2 1560-1609 1956

Hence, one volition is from the judgment of general estimation; the other is from the judgment of particular approbation, and thus becomes a nolition.

The Works of James Arminius, Vol. 2 1560-1609 1956

Wherefore, since it is impossible that there should be only a single genus of volition and nolition, or one mode of willing and not willing, by which a man wills the good and does not will the same good, and by which he does not will the evil and wills the same evil; this phrase,

The Works of James Arminius, Vol. 2 1560-1609 1956