perdurantism

The issue here is not the truth of endurantism and perdurantism as accounts of the persistence of objects and events.

Auditory Perception O'Callaghan, Casey 2009

Lewis says that this argument supports the rival theory of perdurantism, which says that objects persist by having different temporal parts at different times.

Intrinsic vs. Extrinsic Properties Weatherson, Brian 2006

In conjunction with perdurantism, this entails that all the facts about a given persisting object supervene upon intrinsic facts about its briefest temporal parts.

Temporal Parts Hawley, Katherine 2004

Suggested Reading: Broad (1927, chapter 2) is an early discussion of the links between perdurantism and STR; see also Quine (1960, p. 172); Rea (1998b, section 1.1) responds.

Temporal Parts Hawley, Katherine 2004

A third argument from STR to perdurantism does not rely on the claim that STR is out-and-out incompatible with endurantism.

Temporal Parts Hawley, Katherine 2004

In principle, yes, but this would be strategically unwise: accepting the possibility of complete coincidence without identity leaves perdurantism with no advantage over the standard endurantist account of coincidence.

Temporal Parts Hawley, Katherine 2004

But the combination of universalism and perdurantism permits a less radical version of the view: there are lots of four-dimensional objects which share temporal parts with the wheeled thing in your bike shed, and it's up to us which one of those counts as a

Temporal Parts Hawley, Katherine 2004

Or are eternalists free to choose between endurantism and perdurantism?

Temporal Parts Hawley, Katherine 2004

Some perdurantists stick with perdurantism, but reject Humean Supervenience.

Temporal Parts Hawley, Katherine 2004

A first argument from STR to perdurantism goes as follows: STR shows space to be much like time, objects extend in space by having spatial parts, so objects persist through time by having temporal parts.

Temporal Parts Hawley, Katherine 2004