phenomenalist

A theorist who denies that we are aware of mind-independent objects at all, directly or indirectly, but only of sense-data, is known as a phenomenalist or an idealist about perception (see Foster 2000 for a recent defence of this view).

The Problem of Perception Crane, Tim 2005

Not only does no part o the definition of neutral monism in any way require that it be even quasi-phenomenalistic, there is no phase in Russell's intellectual development at which he would simultaneously have considered himself a neutral monist and any kind of phenomenalist at all.

Neutral Monism Stubenberg, Leopold 2005

Now, if I were a phenomenalist, I would rewrite that title as, "Do that which will produce the sense data you interpret as 'moving north,' or else experience the sense-data -- followed by the immediate cessation thereof -- you would interpret as 'being eaten.'"

January Christian Science Fiction & Fantasy Blog Tour 2010

Now, if I were a phenomenalist, I would rewrite that title as, "Do that which will produce the sense data you interpret as 'moving north,' or else experience the sense-data -- followed by the immediate cessation thereof -- you would interpret as 'being eaten.'"

Archive 2010-01-01 2010

Bolzano's philosophy of science can thus be found to be empiricist, founded on a phenomenalist basis.

Slices of Matisse gerard varni 2009

Mach is not a phenomenalist under normal uses of this term, but this certainly requires investigation.

Ernst Mach Pojman, Paul 2009

First, to whatever extent he was a phenomenalist, he was a ˜scientific™ phenomenalist: his ideas were not derived from philosophical skepticism but through application of the results of psychology and evolutionary theory.

Ernst Mach Pojman, Paul 2009

In the next passages, she also reveals a phenomenalist view about the individuality of physical objects: their

Mary Astell Sowaal, Alice 2008

These discussions, and what he says elsewhere about observation and inquiry, show that Mill is not the simplistic phenomenalist and foundationalist that he is often made out to be.

John Stuart Mill Wilson, Fred 2007

This makes clear that, unlike some of the logical positivists, he is no crude phenomenalist who insists that judgments of sense and only judgments of sense can constitute the staring point, or indeed, the “foundation” for all empirical inquiry.

John Stuart Mill Wilson, Fred 2007