rationalizability

These common knowledge assumptions are the motivational basis for the solution concept for noncooperative games known as rationalizability, introduced independently by Bernheim (1984) and Pearce (1984).

Common Knowledge Vanderschraaf, Peter 2007

To show that rationalizability is a nontrivial notion, consider the

Common Knowledge Vanderschraaf, Peter 2007

However, the endogenous correlated equilibrium concept is a proper refinement of rationalizability, because the latter does not presuppose that condition (3. iii) holds with respect to the beliefs one's opponents actually have.

Common Knowledge Vanderschraaf, Peter 2007

However, rationalizability becomes an unstable solution concept if the agents come to know more about one another.

Common Knowledge Vanderschraaf, Peter 2007

Hence, the endogenous correlated equilibrium μ* restricts the set of strategies that the agents might follow, as do the Bayes concordant beliefs of rationalizability.

Common Knowledge Vanderschraaf, Peter 2007