remunerable

And again: _Nihil enim est aliud laudari vel culpari, quam imputari alicui malitiam vel bonitatem sui actus_; wherefore that distinction of a twofold goodness, _causans_ and _concomitans_, which the Doctor hath given us, hath no use in this question, because every action is laudable and remunerable which is morally good, whether it be necessary or not.

The Works of Mr. George Gillespie (Vol. 1 of 2) George Gillespie 1630

Whence it is that the hearing of hypocrites, not being accompanied with such goodness, is not remunerable, yet the hearing of the word is an action necessary, because commanded?

The Works of Mr. George Gillespie (Vol. 1 of 2) George Gillespie 1630

Nay, but he saith (1174) that the general goodness which accompanieth the action is remunerable, because it is necessary, but the action itself is not necessary, because that general goodness may be had as well in the omission of it, or in the doing of the contrary, as in the doing of it, whereupon he would have it to follow that the action itself is not remunerable.

The Works of Mr. George Gillespie (Vol. 1 of 2) George Gillespie 1630

Yea, those actions which he calleth necessary, being considered _quo ad individuum_, are no otherwise laudable and remunerable than those which he calleth indifferent, being considered in like manner

The Works of Mr. George Gillespie (Vol. 1 of 2) George Gillespie 1630

What! Could the Doctor say that these good actions which he calleth indifferent, and of which he saith that they are done in faith, and for the right end, are not laudable nor remunerable?

The Works of Mr. George Gillespie (Vol. 1 of 2) George Gillespie 1630

This goodness he calleth legal, and saith that it maketh an action necessary; in which respect indifferent actions are not good, but those only which God in his law hath commanded, and which are remunerable with eternal life.

The Works of Mr. George Gillespie (Vol. 1 of 2) George Gillespie 1630

Doctor calleth indifferent, are agreeable to right reason, they are, therefore, not only morally good, but also laudable and remunerable, and so not indifferent.

The Works of Mr. George Gillespie (Vol. 1 of 2) George Gillespie 1630

There is no difference which can here be imagined except this: That the individual action of hearing the word (when one heareth aright) is good and remunerable in a double respect, namely, because it is both good in itself, or _quo ad speciem_, and likewise

The Works of Mr. George Gillespie (Vol. 1 of 2) George Gillespie 1630

That which we crave is, that a difference may be showed betwixt the remunerable goodness of the one and of the other, both being considered _quo ad individuum_.

The Works of Mr. George Gillespie (Vol. 1 of 2) George Gillespie 1630

Since, then, those actions are laudable and remunerable which are morally good, and those are morally good which are agreeable to right reason, it followeth, that forasmuch as those actions which the

The Works of Mr. George Gillespie (Vol. 1 of 2) George Gillespie 1630