E

On this view, a particular experience E that is a veridical perception of a particular mind-independent object O will have an intentional content with a demonstrative element that successfully refers to O, and a distinct particular experience E* will have an intentional content with the same veridicality conditions only if its intentional content contains a demonstrative element that also refers to O.

Petty Injuries

E and its negation ~E (assumed to be the locus of all the non-inferential changes in probability) from initial probabilities between zero and one to

Bayesian Epistemology

A corollary is that, where H entails E, ~E would disconfirm H, by reducing its probability to zero.

Bayesian Epistemology

While a proponent of theistic pragmatic arguments cannot swear allegiance to (E), she can, clearly enough, adhere to (E²).

Pragmatic Arguments for Belief in God

H predicts E more strongly than H* does, and (b) ~H predicts ~E more strongly than

Bayes' Theorem

The effective increment of evidence [12] that E provides for H is the amount by which the incremental evidence that E provides for H exceeds the incremental evidence that ~E provides for H.

Bayes' Theorem

H receives a greater increment (or lesser decrement) of evidential support from E than from E* if and only if PE (H) exceeds

Bayes' Theorem

E provides more incremental evidence than E* does for H

Bayes' Theorem

E and E* provide for H is the amount by which the incremental evidence that E provides for H exceeds the incremental evidence that E* provides for

Bayes' Theorem

If H entails both E and E*, say, then Bayes 'Theorem entails that the least probable of the two supports H more strongly.

Bayes' Theorem